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that is, they would be close enough for him to "reach for them."

C. To furnish the advice, Chief SAS stated that he would make available an experienced, mature, able case officer and a small team to support our representation in contact with AMBIDDY/1's group. Specifically, Chief SAS mentioned a younger case officer to help our representative, a man-of-all-work, a translator, and two radio operators. AMBIDDY/1 assured that he had a man for the job of translator.

D. No Contract Yet: Chief SAS emphasized at this time, as he did on several other occasions during the conversation, that he was not empowered to "sign a contract" with AMBIDDY/1 and he emphasized in equally strong terms that this assistance does not include any commitments of U.S. troops under any circumstances; except that, as Secretary of Defense McNamara had previously stated, the U.S. would not stand idly by if the Soviet Union should commit its troops to suppress a popular uprising of the Cuban people. Any victory won would be a Cuban victory. Chief SAS stipulated the above four points to be the ground rules for the exploratory and actual work relationship between AMBIDDY/1 and the Agency.

E. At this point, Chief SAS turned to the questions which must be answered before the next step can be taken in this plan. It would be necessary for AMBIDDY/1 to furnish the following:

1. A base from which to operate.
2. Individuals dedicated and stout-hearted enough to return to the fight of freeing Cuba.
3. A general plan as to what can be done and how to go about it.

At this point, Chief SAS emphasized again that this is to be a "Cuban show" and an attempt to prove that Fidel can be destroyed by the efforts of the Cuban people.

F. Chief SAS reminded AMBIDDY/1 that the first order of business was to be the procurement of a base and that AMBIDDY/1 should proceed after a waiting period of approximately three days to survey the Caribbean area. Specifically mentioned by Chief SAS were Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Colombia. At this time AMBIDDY/1 mentioned that he had been told by WAVE representatives to scratch Nicaragua as a possible base for the reason that this is a "dictatorship."

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AMBIDDY/1 was told, and he pointed out himself, that the use of a piece of property in Nicaragua should not be interpreted as the acceptance of the Nicaraguan government's philosophy. The possibility of a Nicaraguan base was accepted. Chief SAS made it perfectly clear that if AMBIDDY/1's negotiations with these governments should be leaked or if the U.S. Government were officially asked if it has a part to play, the U.S. Government would deny any part in the activity. On the other hand it was suggested that AMBIDDY/1 might possibly find it easier to procure a base if he were to say that the U.S. Government might assist him if he had a base from which to operate. Again Chief SAS indicated that whereas the U.S. Government would not be willing to formally admit any participation, it could conceivably make known its sympathy with AMBIDDY/1's plans and activity and give its "unofficial" nod. In general, AMBIDDY/1 was made to understand that the hand of the U.S. Government cannot and will not be revealed, but at the same time we would be willing to unofficially and informally assist, however possible.

G. Chief SAS told AMBIDDY/1 that once he had procured a base and prepared a plan, it would be possible for Chief SAS to take the operation one step further and seek approval in Washington. Chief SAS observed that word will get around that AMBIDDY/1 has the support of the U.S. Government, which, of course, we will deny. AMBIDDY/1 informed Chief SAS that he had already begun building the story of support by certain Central American countries and even European aid, specifically from General DeGaulle. Chief SAS stated that he raised this particular point regarding probably leaks of U.S. support to AMBIDDY/1 with the thought that this would result in a great number of Cubans, who really want to fight Castro and Communism, rallying to AMBIDDY/1. This would mean that AMBIDDY/1 would find it necessary to be selective in his choice of collaborators. AMBIDDY/1 agreed that "quality" should be the criteria.

H. Chief SAS observed that the number of collaborators would determine how many people would be needed to support the operation, as would the size of the base. The conversation dwelt for some time on the equipment that would be needed and AMBIDDY/1 informed Chief SAS that he had a PC Boat with two General Motor's engines. Chief SAS stated that he would like to have a representative of his in the NAVE area see AMBIDDY/1's boat, in order to assess its general seaworthiness. This was fine with AMBIDDY/1. In this connection AMBIDDY/1 stated that he can provide a crew for this boat, the mechanics necessary to keep it in operation, as well as men familiar with weapons and logistics.

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AMBIDDY/1 obviously was not too sure of his strength in the logistical field. Chief SAS noted that he might be able to lend a log officer to help in this regard. So far as radio operators are concerned, AMBIDDY/1 informed Chief SAS that he has these but that he does not have the necessary equipment. To close his part of the conversation, Chief SAS referred again to the fact that his representative would be present to advise the group, that it would not be necessary to completely agree with the advice, and that if in fact the adviser sent to AMBIDDY/1 proved unacceptable, another could be substituted for him. Typically, AMBIDDY/1 hastened to assure Chief SAS that they would certainly be able to get along with his representative, and that he foresaw no difficulty or getting on with the problem of finding a base and presenting a plan. Chief SAS emphasized that he did not want a minutely detailed plan, but the concrete outline of AMBIDDY/1's ideas. At this point Chief SAS asked AMBIDDY/1 to take up whatever points he had in mind. These follow:

1. AMBIDDY/1's Statement: AMBIDDY/1 has had some problems along the following lines:

a. An inability to work out satisfactorily a radio program to be beamed to Cuba. According to AMBIDDY/1, a plan has been worked out for a ten-minute program, three times weekly on a station which beams largely to the exile community and is able to reach only a very limited part of Cuba. This is not a satisfactory solution to their (MRR) problem.

b. Problems surrounding publication of issue number two of his newspaper. Apparently the station wants another memo from AMBIDDY/1 regarding issue number two. (Chief SAS took up with WAVE on 2 May.)

c. AMBIDDY/1 states that approximately one month ago he had raised the question of the architect convention to be held in Cuba, and that he had provided WAVE a contact with an exile architect but that nothing concrete had come of this to date. (Note: At this point Chief SAS reminded AMBIDDY/1 that it has been difficult to arrive at a solution of certain problems during this period when so much attention has been diverted to the problems of the hit-and-run raids and the crisis within the CRC.)

d. AMBIDDDY/1 stated that with a dissolution of the CRC, his organization would be cut off from its support of some \$4,000 monthly. Apparently the MRR was paid \$4,000 for April but has not received anything for May. This was resolved by a telephone call by Chief SAS to WAVE on 2 May; MRR to continue receiving this fund.

e. AMBIDDDY/1 also indicated a need for funds to pay the rent of the office used by the MRR. (Idem phone call on 2 May.)

f. AMBIDDDY/1 stated that he had been asked by WAVE to furnish personnel for infiltration into Cuba. He stated that he is ready and able to do so and all he needs to know is how many and when. He did ask, however, that these men not be asked to give up their membership in the MRR and become "solely agents." When asked if he had experiences of this type of handling in the past, AMBIDDDY/1 stated that there had been cases when members of his organization had been told to forget their MRR membership, that now "they were working for KUBARK." Chief SAS said that this problem could be resolved and added that he foresaw that under certain circumstances our Miami office could help AMBIDDDY/1 to put his people into Cuba for the "independent" operations, especially in case of North Coast ops.

g. AMBIDDDY/1 advised he was presently training some of his personnel in intelligence and counter-intelligence work. He wondered if it would be possible to have KUBARK assist the BRAC officer he is using to do this. Chief SAS told him that KUBARK would be willing to assist, but that our training requirements were exceedingly heavy and it would be difficult to say when this could be done. At this point Chief SAS stated that he would from time to time send experts to assist AMBIDDDY/1 but that these men would not be part of the permanent group supporting and advising AMBIDDDY/1.

2. The meeting ended with assurances on the part of AMBIDDDY/1 that he was willing to go all out to work with KUBARK; that the MRR had the longest list of martyrs in the Cuban cause; that it had been his organization that had put in the greatest number

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of arms into Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion and finally that the MRR and AMBIDDY/1 could be counted upon. Chief, SAS assured AMBIDDY/1 of his high esteem of AMBIDDY/1 and his organization, of which he had heard and read much. Chief, SAS met with AMBIDDY/1 as Don Archer.

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